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ABSTRACT
The Russian Federation became a member of the Council of Europe in 1996. 
This step determined the development of Russia’s judicial system for the 
coming several decades and made it possible for Russia’s national system of 
law to integrate into judicial landscape of Europe, thereby enabling Russia 
to uphold democratic values. The emergence of new legislation affected all 
branches of Russia’s system of law. But the experience of the two decades 
has demonstrated that such modernization can be effective only by way of 
dialogue rather than by simple copying and implementing international rules.
An important role in this process was played by the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation (RF) that was founded in 1991. The paper reviews 
the role it played in the 1993 Constitutional crisis, examines the Court’s 
structure and powers, and also analyzes the juridical nature of its decisions. 
The Author analyzes the collisions between decisions handed down by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Constitution of Russia from the 
point of view of the stand taken by the Constitutional Court of the RF. In the 
end, the Author arrives at the conclusion that there is a need for a dialogue 
among European and national systems of justice with the help of filtration 
mechanisms and multilevel constitutionalism.
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RESUMEN
La Federación Rusa se convirtió en miembro del Consejo de Europa en 1996. 
Este proceso determinó el desarrollo del sistema judicial ruso y permitió que 
el sistema legal nacional pudiese integrarse al escenario judicial europeo, 
permitiendo incluso que Rusia tuviese valores democráticos. La aparición 
de esta nueva legislación afectó todas las ramas del sistema legal ruso; sin 
embargo, el transcurso de más de dos décadas demuestra que tal avance solo 
puede hacerse efectivo en la medida que exista un verdadero diálogo judicial 
más allá de la réplica e implementación de normas internacionales.
Es por esto que la Corte Constitucional de la Federación Rusa, establecida 
en 1991, ha jugado un rol determinante. Este artículo revisa el rol que des-
empeñó esta corporación durante la crisis constitucional de 1993, examina 
su estructura, sus poderes y la naturaleza jurídica de sus decisiones. Analiza 
además las colisiones entre las decisiones del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos 
Humanos y la Constitución rusa (desde la perspectiva adoptada por la Corte 
Constitucional rusa). Finalmente concluye que existe la necesidad de esta-
blecer un verdadero diálogo entre los sistemas de justicia europeo y nacional, 
con la ayuda de mecanismos de filtración y constitucionalismo multinivel. 
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INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of the ussr and the construction of new statehood in Russia 
in the 1990s placed an important task before the country, namely – to work 
out and adopt new legislation that complied with the conditions whereby 
the country was going over to a market economy and democratic regime. It 
was precisely in this way that the Russian Federation could strive to enter 
the European legal landscape and build its relations with other States on a 
parity basis. However, in the process of forming a new system of law Russia 
encountered a number of problems of a legal nature, as well as of a socio-
economic and political character. 
Russia ascended to the Charter of the Council of Europe on February 28, 
1996. As it ascended the Charter, the Russian Federation signed the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter – Con-
vention), the Convention against Torture, Cruel Other Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, the Framework Convention on the Protection of 
National Minorities and the European Charter on Local Self-Government.
The Conventions were ratified two years later in 1998.The two year pe-
riod that was required for upgrading domestic legislation on application of 
laws to comply with Conventions and standards of the Council of Europe, 
was a very short period, if one takes into account the amount of work that 
had to be done.1 
It was precisely due to the haste with which the Conventions were ratified 
in Russia is the reason, as we see it, many discrepancies and shortcomings 
concerning their application, objective difficulties of Russia’s transition from 
the Soviet regime to a democracy were not taken into account. Besides that, 
there were also contradictions of a much deeper significance. These difficulties 
stem from the fact that Russia belongs to the Continental (Romano-Germanic) 
system of written law in which the main source of law is the normative legal 
act. The Convention and court practice based on its normative guidelines are 
a vivid example of precedent-based law that belongs to the Anglo-American 
system of law. The norm-parameters in the Convention are filled with legal 
content via a precedent-interpretation which is simply not used in Russia’s 
internal legal regulation practice, and moreover, it is not recognized by 
Russia’s juridical doctrine in general. 
Consequently, by ratifying the Convention, Russia acquired for herself, 
at the end of the 1990’s, an uncharacteristic supranational “addition” or 
“second-helping” to its system of law. Also, one must take into account the 
growing number of precedents themselves, (at the moment, there are more 
than 15,000), as well as the peculiar mechanism of updating the norm-
1 Many countries needed for this process much more time, and the record is France by 
signing the European Convention in 1950, it ratified it only in 1974.
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guidelines via the practically annual appearance of new additional Protocols 
to the Convention. Therefore, it is possible to say that there has appeared in 
Russia’s legal system quite a strange or alien (both from the materialistic and 
procedural points of view) organism that is constantly growing, and having 
a tendency to squeeze out national legal institutions, norms and traditions. 
Certain countries (the Netherlands, Austria) give priority to the Convention 
over and above their own Constitutions; in a considerable number of countries 
(France, Spain and others) the Convention has a higher status than ordinary 
laws, but lower than their Constitutions; in other countries (Great Britain, 
Russia) it has the status of common law. And, this is no coincidence, since 
neither Great Britain nor Russia have their sights set on acquiring membership 
of West European “State within a State” (European Union).
Until recently, it seemed that on the issue of relationship between Russia’s 
Constitution and the Convention there was absolutely no serious theoretical 
problem. After all, both the Constitution and the Convention quite clearly 
“refer to a coinciding catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms,”2 and 
in 2006, Russia’s Constitutional Court pointed out in its Resolution that the 
subject of its regulation, as well as that of the eChr, was one and the same, 
namely – human rights and fundamental freedoms.
However, every year is witnessing a growing number of eChr rulings that 
artificially precipitated collisions between statutes in Russia’s Constitution and 
in the Convention. As a result, the eChr is factually demanding chat Russia 
must change its Constitution – a demand that is unconditionally groundless 
from the legal point of view. 
Certain Russian jurists and politicians have proposed, and are still proposing, 
the easiest way of resolving such collisions – to quit the 1950 Convention 
– and the most radical of them, even propose to quit the Council of Europe. 
However, in our opinion such a solution to the problem of collisions does 
not at all look constructive in the present-day world of a global movement 
of Sts and their systems of law. After the Convention was ratified, Russia 
adopted a great number of legislative acts upholding civil rights that allow 
Russia to integrate into the European legal landscape. By their ongoing dia-
logue and mutual interest, the eChr and the Constitutional Court of Russia are 
enriching and improving each other’s practice, and in so doing, are uniting 
national and supranational efforts to ensure contemporary law and order, and 
that is was structuring of the European Convention into Russia’s system of 
law corresponds with the legal development of Russia strategically. 
However, it is important to remember: any demands from the outside to 
alter or change the National Constitution are unacceptable. That is why the 
2 zOrkin, V. D. The dialogue of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and 
the European Court on Human Rights in the context of constitutional order. Viewed 27 May 
2017. Available from: ksrf.ru›News/Speech/Pages/ViewItem.aspx 
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only possible choice for us is: to embark upon an honest road of building such 
a system of law and order which, on the one hand, would cover the adopted 
(by Russia also) international legal standards concerning human rights, and 
on the other hand, this process will be carried out not by way of their im-
plementation of mechanically carrying them over to the national system of 
law. Such interlinking and mutual enrichment of national and supranational 
legal regulation practice in the 21st Century should be conducted by way of 
dialogue mechanisms, cultures and traditions.3 
The blending or combining of national systems of law, as one of the main 
contemporary integration tendencies should be based on a thorough study 
of national legal practice, on the law-administering traditions and on the 
specific understanding of jurisprudence by the population of a given State. 
1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN RUSSIA
A study of the relationship between national and supranational regulation 
would not be complete and objective without defining the role and the place 
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the system of law 
of present-day Russia. The Constitutional Court occupies a special place 
within the system of bodies of empowered with State authority on Russia 
since it acts as an arbiter between the State, on the one hand, and its citizens 
on the other hand. Its decisions and judgments define the constitutionality 
of adopted decisions and exert great influence on politics. It also acts as the 
guarantor of the existing Constitution, and in so doing, it safeguards the 
constitutionality of politics. 
The Constitutional Court was established in Russia in 1991. This was 
but one of the landmark events confirming new Russia’s firm adherence to 
European legal values. This was the first time in the entire history of Russia 
that such a new body of judicial power had been created in its State system.
However, that body had a predecessor – it was the ussr Constitutional 
Oversight (Supervision) Committee that was created during the perestroika 
(or restructuring) period in 1989. However, since the ussr did not have a 
system in which authority was shared, the functions of that Committee were 
insignificant. Unlike that Committee, the Constitutional Court was vested with 
broad authority – and this enabled it to participate actively and constructively 
in regulating the 1992-1993 constitutional crisis in Russia.4
3 See aCOsta alVaraDO, P. A. Diálogo judicial y constitucionalismo multinivel. El caso 
de la red judicial latinoamericana. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2014; aCOsta 
alVaraDO, P. A. El diálogo judicial interamericano, un camino de doble vía hacia la protección 
efectiva. Diálogo entre cortes. arCarO COnCi, L. y mezzetti, L. (eds.). Brasilia: Oab, 2015.
4 See Vitruk, N. V. Constitutional Justice in Russia (1991-2001). Notes on Theory and 
Practice. Moscow: Gorodets-Izdat, 2001.
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In order to occupy such a post in the political system of Russia, the Consti-
tutional Court, and especially its Chairman, Valeri Zorkin, had to cover a long 
and difficult road.5 The tragic pages in the contemporary history of Russia are 
related to the beginning of the 1990s – more precisely, with the rule of the 
first President of Russia – Boris Yeltsin. His Decree on September 21, 1993 
“On the stage-by-stage reform in the Russian Federation,” abolished the old 
parliament – the Supreme Soviet and designated elections of the president 
and a new parliament – the State Duma. What is more, Yeltsin “proposed” not 
to convene a session of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
so as not to give an official evaluation of the President’s actions.
 And this is precisely when the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valeri 
Zorkin, and other Court Judges took a heroic stand: the Constitutional Court 
did not agree with that (Yeltsin’s) “proposal.” The Constitutional Court handed 
down its Conclusion that classified the Decree and (Yeltsin’s) September 21, 
1993 “Appeal of the President to the citizens of Russia” as not complying 
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and serving as grounds for 
removal (impeachment) of the President from office. On September 22, 
1993, Yeltsin issued a new Decree No. 1400 on dissolving Parliament which 
laid the groundwork for the Constitutional Court to hand down a ruling that 
immediately declared Boris Yeltsin’s presidential powers null and void. 
How the events at the end of September and the beginning of October un-
folded (in Moscow) are well-known and have become part of Russia’s history: 
an armed conflict broke out between the Supreme Soviet Deputies (parliament 
members) and President Yeltsin. The majority of the parliament members re-
fused to obey Yeltsin’s Decree, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (top 
ruling body of the Parliament) passed a ruling that his (Yeltsin’s) presidential 
powers were terminated the moment he had signed the above-mentioned Decree.
On October 7, 1993 Yeltsin signed a new Decree which established that the 
legal regulation of issues of a budgetary-financial nature, questions concerning 
land reform, property, civil service and social activity of the population were 
to be implemented by the President of the Russian Federation.6 The question 
which comes to mind here is the following: why should such serious and quite 
complicated questions which, by far, did not always require urgent decision, 
should be regulated by (presidential) Decrees, rather than by (parliamentary) 
laws? The Parliament was practically stripped of its legislative functions 
and the country was slipping towards emergency legislation. Actually, what 
Yeltsin was doing was concentrating all the ruling powers in the State into 
his own hands, and terminating the activity of many governing bodies in the 
center and at local levels.7 
5 See zOrkin, V. D. Contemporary World, Law and the Constitution. Moscow: Norma, 2010.
6 COltOn, T. Yeltsin. Moscow: Colibry, 2013, 45.
7 fyODOrOV, B. G. Ten Mad Days with Boris Yeltsin. Moscow: Algorithm, 2011, 137.
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An open conflict or showdown between Yeltsin and the Constitutional 
Court was unfolding. In his October 7, 1993 Decree, Yeltsin asserted that 
the Constitutional Court “…had transformed from a body of constitutional 
justice into a weapon of political struggle that posed an exclusive threat to 
the State.” However, according to the Law of that period of time, the Cons-
titutional Court had the power and authority to give its own assessment of 
the acts of (legislative) bodies and of top officials in the State. Nonetheless, 
a threat of elimination was looming over the Constitutional Court. Yeltsin’s 
(October 7) Decree contained the idea of abolishing the Constitutional Court, 
and replacing it with a Collegium (Panel) of the Supreme Court having si-
milar functions. However, that idea did not come in for support in Yeltsin’s 
entourage, and the Constitutional Court was preserved. True, its powers and 
authority were substantially “clipped.”
For example, the Constitutional Court was no longer empowered to hand 
down an assessment of the constitutional acts and actions of top level officials. 
The Constitutional Court no longer had the right to assess the constitutio-
nality of political parties and other public associations.8 The Draft Law (or 
Bill) on the Constitutional Court had assumed leaving the Court the right to 
assess the constitutionality of practical cases of applying judicial powers. 
However, another approach concerning this issue got the upper hand, and 
it is reflected in the text of the Law: the Constitutional Court shall assess 
the constitutionality of the applied law or the law to be applied in respect to 
a given case, upon complaints of violation of the Constitutional rights and 
freedoms of a citizen, and in respect to court requests.
The Constitutional Court held its ground in a very serious – and not just 
a constitutional, but social-political crisis which, by its intensity, was akin 
to a small civil war.
2. STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Constitutional justice, as a type of judicial action, is an inseparable part or 
feature of a law-governed State. The activity and structure of Russia’s Cons-
titutional Court are regulated by the Constitution of the RF9 and the Federal 
Constitutional Law.10 
8 Chairman of Russia’s Constitutional Court Valeriy Zorkin denounces Yeltsin’s crimes. 
Viewed 27 May 2017. Available from: http://www.prezidentpress.ru/news/zakon/1622-glava-
ks-rf-valeriy-zorkin-protiv-prestupleniy-elcina.html
9 Constitution of the Russian Federation – 1993. Art. 125. Viewed 29 May 2016. Available 
from: http://base.garant.ru/10103000/7/#block_7000 
10 Federal Constitutional Law as of July 21, 1994, No. 1-fCl “On Constitutional Court of 
Russian Federation”. Viewed 29 May 2016. Available from: http.//base.garant.ru/10101207/
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The Constitutional Court is empowered with the following authority: its 
main goal is to exercise constitutional supervision, i.e., to consider cases 
on the correspondence to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 
normative acts and treaties, to resolve disputes concerning the competence 
between federal bodies of State power, between federal bodies and bodies 
of State power in the subjects of the Russian Federation; to assess the cons-
titutionality of the applied law or the law to be applied in respect to a given 
case, upon complaints of violation of the Constitutional rights and freedoms 
of a citizen, and in respect to court requests; to interpret the Constitution of 
Russia; at the request of the Federation Council,11 to submit its conclusion on 
observance of the established order for tabling accusations of State treason 
or having committed some other grave crime against the President; to set 
forth the legislative initiative on questions and issues within its jurisdiction.
Since the Constitutional Court has the right to interpret the Constitution 
and Federal Laws, this enhances the efficiency of its work in strengthening 
statehood based on law and upgrading the unified field of jurisdiction.
Legal Acts or the individual statutes thereof that have been found un-
constitutional are declared null and void, while international treaties that do 
not correspond with the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall not be 
introduced or applied in Russia.
Therefore, it may be said that the specific role of the Constitutional Court 
as a body of constitutional supervision in Russia enables it to act as the arbiter 
in disputes concerning interpretation of laws. In so doing, it (Constitutional 
Court) clears the legal field from improperly passed statutes, thereby com-
pelling legislators to take a more responsible approach to law-making.
The Constitutional Court of Russia consists of nineteen judges. The Judges 
are appointed by the Federation Council upon presentation by the President, 
by secret ballot voting. The Constitutional Court is empowered to conduct 
its functions upon the presence of two-thirds of the overall number of its 
judges. The powers of the Court are not limited to any particular period of 
time. The candidates for the post of a judge in this Court must meet more 
stringent requirements than for posts in other courts: at least 40 years of age, 
15 years of judicial practice and acknowledged scientific reputation. The 
age limit for holding such a post in the Constitutional Court is 70 years. The 
Court is based in St. Petersburg.
Up to 2011, the Court consisted of two Chambers. Such a structure en-
sured the maximum possible number of judicial cases to pass through the 
Court in the conditions that existed during that period. This was in line with 
the traditional understanding of the continuity principle, whereby the Court 
11 Federal Council is one of the chambers of the Federal Assembly (Russian Parliament).
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was not able to examine a new legal case without having completed the 
preceding one. 
However, a new principle that rescinded this restriction was adopted by 
the Russian Constitutional judiciary system in 2011. This system introdu-
ced a long-standing and widely-used in many European States procedure of 
resolving Constitutional judicial cases without holding hearings, and that is 
why division of the Court was no longer needed.12 
The main vector of the Russian Constitutional Court’s work is examining 
complaints concerning alleged violations of Constitutional rights and freedoms 
of citizens. Annually, the Court receives from 14,000 to 19,000 complaints 
from citizens, which testifies to the people’s trust of the Constitutional Court.
3. JURIDICAL NATURE OF DECISIONS HANDED DOWN BY RUSSIA’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The stand of the Russian Constitutional Court on different issues is expressed 
in the decisions it hands down. Summaries on these decisions are compiled 
on an annual basis. For instance, the 2009 Summary presented information 
concerning fulfillment of the Constitutional Court’s decisions; in 2012 – in-
formation on what had been done to improve the Court’s work in protecting 
citizens’ rights and freedoms; in 2014 – the Court’s work to upgrade the 
judiciary system. The Court also regularly (quarterly and semi-annually) 
issues Reviews of the Court’s activity. These documents are posted on the 
Constitutional Court’s official Internet-Portal and serve Russian courts as 
guidelines in their work.13 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court are formulated as Acts and Con-
clusions.14 An Act is the name given to a decision taken on issues concer-
ning the constitutionality of the normative legality of an Act (Bill) or on an 
international treaty (agreement) that has not yet come into force, as well 
as on disputes concerning the competence and on interpretations of the 
RF Constitution; while the Court’s conclusions deal with observance of a 
prescribed procedure for charging the President of the Russian Federation 
of committing a grave offense.15
12 Federal Constitutional Law as of July 21, 1994, No. 1-fCl “On Constitutional Court 
of Russian Federation”. Art. 47. Viewed 29 May 2016. Available from: http.//base.garant.
ru/10101207/
13 See Official website of Russia’s Constitutional Court. Available from: http://www.ksrf.
ru/ru/info
14 Federal Constitutional Law as of July 21, 1994, No. 1-fCl “On Constitutional Court 
of Russian Federation”. Art. 71.  Viewed 27 May 2017. Available from: http.//base.garant.
ru/10101207/ 
15 Constitutional Court has not issued its conclusions since the Russian Constitution came 
into force in 1993.
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The Court is also empowered to hand down its Qualification – most of-
ten this concerns defining its motivation of a decision on refusal to accept 
a citizen’s complaint.
The overwhelming majority of the Court’s decisions on constitutionally 
motivated complaints of citizens (or their organizations) - complaints related 
to practically the entire spectrum of political, economic, labor, social and 
other relations. A total of 270,664 complaints were filed in the Constitutional 
Court from January 1, 1995 to September 2013, on which the Court handed 
down 368 Acts and 15,386 Qualifications.
If we speak about the content aspect of the Constitutional Court’s activity, 
we should note, first of all, that its decisions concern the widest range of 
issues related to Constitutional status of the individual, free economic entre-
preneurship, sovereign integrity of Russian statehood, organization of public 
authority, federative structure, local self-government, juridical responsibility, 
various types of judiciary. By no means would it be an exaggeration to say 
that actual comprehensive perception of Russian law-making would have 
been impossible without taking into account the legal groundwork established 
by the Constitutional Court. This is now recognized as being quite natural 
for a present-day law-governed democracy, since it recognizes that man, his 
rights and freedoms, are the uppermost constitutional value. 
Neither does the Constitutional Court sidestep principles of constitutional 
significance of different branches of law, thereby promoting them to a kind 
of “constitutionalization”. For instance, in decisions of the Russian Cons-
titutional Court you will come across direct mention of Civil Legislation 
principles (Decision No. 20-P) as of December 23, 2003; constitutional 
principles of regulating economic relations (Decision No. 10-P) as of June 
22, 2009; basic principles of legally regulating relations in the sphere of the 
natural environment and ecological safety (Decision No. 8-P) as of May 14, 
2009; the principle concerning the need to uphold the rights and legitimate 
interests of the employee as the least protected party in labor relationships 
(Decision No. 3-P) as of March 15, 2005. Moreover, the Court does not 
limit itself to a simple reminder of these principles in its decisions, but also 
lays the legal groundwork of its demands addressed to courts. For example, 
then and again the Constitutional Court has drawn attention to the fact that 
implementation of the principle about all being equal before the law and in 
court would be impossible without observing its inherent criteria of common 
sense, proportionality, as well as the need to limit rights and freedoms in a 
democratic law-governed society: what is more, public interests16 may justify 
legal limitations of rights and freedoms – only if such limitations adequately 
conform with the socially required result; the goal of only rationally orga-
16 Constitution of the Russian Federation – 1993. Art. 55 [Viewed 25 May 2016]. Available 
from: http://base.garant.ru/10103000/7/#block_7000
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nizing the work of bodies of power cannot serve as the basis for limiting 
rights and freedoms; any differentiation that leads to variations of the rights 
and duties of legal entities is impermissible – only if such a differentiation 
is objectively justified, well-founded and pursues constitutionally significant 
objectives, and that the legal means employed for attaining such goals are 
comparable to them (Acts of the CC of the RF No. 15-P as of October 30, 
2003, No. 7-P as of June 16, 2006, No. 14-P as of June 22, 2010, No. 20-P 
as of October 10, 2013 and others).
At the same time, it should be noted that the Constitutional Court acts not 
only as “a negative lawmaker” whose decisions boil down to “disqualifying” 
laws or their normative statutes.17 On the contrary, more often than not, in 
cases when there is a departure from the norms of the Constitution due to 
interpretation of an applied law, the Constitutional Court refrains from pas-
sing a verdict of unconstitutional norm. By acting in this manner, the Court 
actually admits that such a law arbitrarily is in line with the Constitution, 
and this therefore obliges all (parties) to follow this particular interpretation, 
and consequently, any departure from it will be tantamount to violation of 
the Constitution. Making use of such possibilities enables the Constitutio-
nal Court to avoid creating legislative loopholes and not to intrude (even in 
temporary legal settlements) in the Parliament’s legislative work.
In the opinion of Court Chairman Valeri Zorkin, the practical work of the 
Constitutional Court has demonstrated a tendency to avoid recognition of 
disputed norms as being “unconstitutional” if there is a possibility of defining 
its constitutional-legal sense and its proper content that excludes any other 
interpretation in the practice of applying laws.18 
In 2015, the Constitutional Court handed down 34 Acts and 3,111 Quali-
fications. 19 Seventeen of the 34 Acts concerned changing of Federal Laws, 
and one Act dealt with changing legislation of a legal entity of the Russian 
Federation. 
When speaking about the Acts, it should be noted that the normative 
principles are to be found both in the resolution and motivation portions. The 
resolution portions formulate the norms that either confirm, or on the contrary, 
negate the constitutionality of the norms in question, or they formulate the 
normative principles that are to explain or define specific constitutional norms. 
In such cases when the Constitutional Court is compelled to terminate this 
or that unconstitutional norm, it then formulates a new, but temporary norm.
17 VOlkOVa, N. S. and habrieVa, T. Y. Legal Principles of Constitutional Court of RF and 
Parliament. Moscow: Norma, 2005, 26.
18 zOrkin, V. D. Constitutional Development of Russia. Moscow: Norma, 2011, 183.
19 See Official website of Russia’s Constitutional Court. Available from: http://www.ksrf.
ru/ru/info
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The legal principles in the motivation portion of the Court’s Decisions 
are not always formulated as norms – quite often they acquire forms of 
“prescriptive” or “suggestive” units.
Summarizing Decisions of the Constitutional Court are quite often linked 
with interpretation of the Constitution of the RF. Such an interpretation 
may be special if it is given upon requests of the President, the Federation 
Council, the State Duma, the Government, legislatures of legal entities (or 
subjects) of the RF, or they may be casual (incidental) – in all other cases, 
they are resolved in court. In 2015, the Constitutional Court handed down 
its interpretation of two Articles of the Constitution of the RF.
The juridical power of the Constitutional Court’s qualification Decisions 
supersedes the juridical power of any Law, and consequently, it is practi-
cally equal to the juridical power of the Constitution itself. The question of 
whether to consider a Decision made by the Court a source of law or not 
remains open for discussion in the corridors of Russian jurisprudence. Some 
of the experts in this field view Constitutional Court Decisions as sources of 
Law while others disagree. Such eminent Russian jurists as S.S. Alexeyev, 
M.N. Marchneko, B.A. Strashun, T.V. Solovyova and M. V. Baglai base their 
view of the Court’s Decisions as sources of Law on various positions.20 At 
the same time, Academician V. S. Nersesyantz holds that it is impossible to 
view courts as a law-making source.21 
Today, Russian jurisprudence is experiencing an ever more popular 
viewpoint that Constitutional Court law-making is a special, diversified form 
of modern law-making undertaken by the uppermost bodies of judicial power 
in order to create optimal conditions for administrating justice.22 
During the past 25 years of its activity, the Constitutional Court has 
formulate the legal principles in all spheres of legal regulation, thereby 
determining the constitutionality of laws and bylaws. Moreover, here we 
are talking about current regulation activity, as well as about parameters 
whereby the State functions, ensuring implementation of the principles of 
democracy, divisions of authority and State sovereignty. During this period, 
gross, and the most obvious violations of the Constitution have disappeared 
20 alekseyeV, S. S. The State and Law. Moscow: Prospekt, 2017; baglai, M. V. A Law-
governed State: From ideas to practice. Kommunist, 1989, 6; marChenkO, M. N. Juridical nature 
and character of the European Court of Human Right’s (eChr) decisions. Moscow State University 
Vestnik (Law), 2016, 2, 3-20; sOlOVyOVa, T. A. Acts issues by Supreme Court of RF, Constitutional 
Court of RF and European Court of Human Rights in the sphere of civil law and the procedure 
of their implementation. Moscow: Monograph. O. V. isayenkOVa (ed.). 2011; strashun, B. A. 
Decisions of RF Constitutional Court as a source of law. Moscow: Norma, 2000.
21 nersesyantz, V. S. The court does not make laws, neither does it govern – It applies 
laws. Judicial practice as a source of law. Moscow, 1997. 
22 maliushin, A. A. Forms of performing law-making function of the Constitutional 
legislation and their place in the hierarchy of the sources of the Russian Law. Law Problems. 
2015, 10, 59-64.
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from Russia’s system of law. Such violations today are to be found only 
at the level of interpretation and in systemic links of norms. Therefore, it 
may be said that virtual unconstitutionality has become rarer in Russian 
legislation.
COMPARATIVE TABLE 
OF nORMATIVE STATuTES RECOGnIzED 
By THE COnSTITuTIOnAL COuRT AS CORRESPOnDInG 
(nOT CORRESPOnDInG) TO THE COnSTITuTIOn   
OF THE RuSSIAn FEDERATIOn (2010-2015)23
year
tOtal 
numbers 
Of aDOPteD 
DeCisiOns 
resOlutiOns reCOgnizing 
nOrmatiVe statue as 
COrresPOnDing tO the 
COnstitutiOn Of the 
russian feDeratiOn
resOlutiOns reCOgnizing 
nOrmatiVe statue as 
nOt COrresPOnDing tO 
the COnstitutiOn Of the 
russian feDeratiOn 
instruCtiOns 
On the neeD 
fOr new legal 
regulatiOn
2010 22 17 7 7
2011 30 18 15 12
2012 34 23 18 18
2013 30 15 26 18
2014 33 41 20 16
2015 34 18 19 14
In the first decades after the Constitution was adopted, the socio-political 
rift and inter-ethnic conflicts represented the greatest danger to Russia since 
they were fraught with collapse of the State. All other threats such as moun-
ting poverty, the merging of authority and big business, corruption could be 
overcome, but collapse of the State would be tantamount to disappearance 
of the country. Not only did the State have to preserve itself, it had to be 
able to effectively uphold the rights of its citizens. It was precisely from 
such considerations that the Constitutional Court proceeded in the 1990’s as 
it sought to find a lawful compromise, and made historic decisions for the 
country on the so-called Case of the CPsu (Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union), as well as on restoring Constitutional Law in the Chechen Republic, 
and on declaration of a moratorium on the death sentence. 
However today, beginning as of 2008, in conditions of the financial-and-
economic crisis, the Court has been consistently taking measures to uphold 
23 Informative and Analytical Report on fulfillment of Russia’s Constitutional Court 
decisions adopted during implementation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in 2015. Viewed 
27 May 2017. Available from: http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/Info/Maintenance/Informationks/Pages/
ReportKS2015.aspxм
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the social rights of citizens, thereby instilling the State to reform social 
legislation in that direction. All this, taken together, fosters social-political 
stability which is extremely important for the country.
In the period from 2012 to 20015, the Court received 45,700 queries out 
of which, more than 12,100 concerned upholding the Constitutional rights 
and freedoms of citizens (including 1,100 protecting labor rights; over 2,300 
protecting housing rights; some 3,800 upholding social rights); more than 
1,200 queries concerning protection of the Constitutional right (on organi-
zing public authority; more than 8,800 queries concerning civil rights and 
procedures; more than 18,100 queries dealing with criminal law and court 
procedures.24 
Moreover, the content of these queries testifies to the desire and striving 
of the citizens of Russia to attain lawful equality: equality to life and housing, 
equality before the law and in court, equality for oneself and for one’s chil-
dren in having access to education, healthcare and cultural values. However, 
when such strivings come up against insurmountable obstacles in the form 
of these or those social, political and economic institutions, the principle of 
equal rights undergoes deformation, creating a gap between law and rights. 
Taking into account the special emphasis made by citizens in their queries 
concerning social injustices, one should be especially aware of the very 
dangerous property-ownership stratification of citizens that came about as 
a result of organizing privatization of State-owned properties in the 1990’s.
Here are two quite simple examples pertaining to the current work of 
the Constitutional Court. The first example concerns Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 26, dating October 30, 2014. It deals with the enquiry made 
by the Parliament of the Chechen Republic to the Constitutional Court on 
the matter of the constitutionality of the amendments to the Law on Civil 
Service. These amendments were introduced in 2013 and they concerned new 
requirements for contenders to the post of a civil servant – namely, such a 
contender had to serve a tour of duty in the Army before taking up a post as 
a civil servant. Here, I would like to explain that prior to 2014 young men 
in the Republic of Chechnya were not called up to serve in the Army since 
that republic was rebuilding itself after the armed actions in the 1990s. So, 
it turned out that without having served a tour of duty in the Army, such 
young men were unable to contend for a post as civil servant, and this was 
the reason for submitting a complaint to the Constitutional Court. The Cons-
titutional Court handed down a ruling abolishing the requirement concerning 
Army service because it violated the principles of justice (fairness), equity 
24 zOrkin, V. D. Constitutional Justice in transitional stage of historical development 
of Russia. Viewed 25 May 2017. Available from: http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/Pages/
ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=75
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and commensurability, as well as the right to choose a field of activity and 
profession by taking a civil service job. 
The second example concerns Constitutional Court Decision No. 13 
dating, dating April 12, 2014 which deals with increasing the sum of the 
fine for breaking a traffic rule if this offense was committed in two subjects 
of Russia – cities of Federal significance, i.e., Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
The Constitutional Court found these principles not running counter to the 
Constitution since they were based on objective criteria and took into account 
the complicated and more publicly dangerous road-and-traffic situation in 
these two major cities of Russia.
The work of the Constitutional Court of the RF testifies to the correct-
ness of the choice to make it the supreme arbiter in settling Constitutional 
legal disputes, as well as the official interpreter and “guardian” of Russia’s 
Constitution.25
4. COLLISIONS BETWEEN DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT  
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR) AND THE CONSTITUTION OF RUSSIA  
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The question concerning the legal nature of the Constitutional Court’s Acts is 
especially interesting. What concerns decisions in which the Court determines 
the validity of this or that law of the Constitution, then such judgments are 
not normative acts since they do not create new norms. the Constitution itself 
is one such act, whereas decisions of the Constitutional Court are acts defi-
ning their application. There have been cases described in juridical literature 
when such Constitutional Court decisions have been ranked higher than acts 
of parliament and decrees of the President. However, this is not true - either 
such decisions proclaim this or that law unconstitutional, or it simply means 
that the Constitution which, by its juridical nature, stands higher than acts 
of parliament and decrees of the President, as well as of other State bodies.
Neither does the Constitutional Court create new legal norms in the pro-
cess of interpreting the Constitution. Interpretation must not be confused 
either with some specific norm of law, or with the norms of law, in general. 
Interpretation is always only a rule for properly understanding the already 
existing norms of law – it is not a new norm.
Several rulings of Russia’s Constitutional Court contain references to the 
European Convention. What is more, in a number of cases it refers to the 
practice of the European Court of Human Rights, thereby entering Russian 
practice of applying law into the European context. 
25 OstaPOViCh, I. Y. Constitutional Court of RF in normative forming process. Russian 
Juridical Journal, 2010, 133-138.
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 Following are several examples of such mutual exchange: for instance, on 
November 20, 2007, the Constitutional Court of Russia adopted Ruling No. 
13-P on the Statutes of the Criminal Procedural Code of the R. F. (hereinafter 
– CPC), The given Ruling does not allow individuals (to whom compulsory 
medical measures based on conclusions of psychiatrists have been taken) 
to personally participate in the criminal proceedings and court sessions, 
to become acquainted with the materials of the case, or to file appeals or 
complaints in respect to adopted decisions. The Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation found these statutes of the CPC as not complying with 
the Constitution – since according to their meaning acquired in the course 
of law administering practice – they do not allow citizens to implement their 
court procedural rights. In essence, this decision of Russia’s Constitutional 
Court can be viewed as fulfillment of the ruling of the European Court on 
Human Rights as of October 20, 2005 on the case of “Romanov versus Rus-
sia.” It was precisely this document that pointed out that the presence of the 
applicant in the courtroom was a necessary condition allowing the judge to 
become convinced of the psychic condition of the applicant and to adopt a 
fair conclusion. In this manner, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Fe-
deration while examining the issue about the constitutionality of a number 
of BPC norms simultaneously resolved the question of bringing into line 
with European standards. 
In the opinion of N. Bondar, a Judge of Russia’s Constitutional Court, 
“while assessing the influence of the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the practice of the Constitutional Court’s forms of con-
trolling norms of law - abstract or specific – the following should be noted: 
out of 168 decisions and rulings of Russia’s Constitutional Court, as of May 
1, 2010, refer directly to judicial principles of the eChr, or refer to its de-
cisions; 160 decisions were adopted under direct norm control procedures; 
four more decisions were passed under abstract and another four by “joint 
norm control” procedures.26 A number of the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sions refer to conventional norms in the interpretation of the eChr and were 
used not only for founding the legal basis of the Court’s stand on the given 
case, but were also included in the resolution part of its decision. Russia’s 
Constitutional Court is more and more often referring to the eChr’s practice 
within the framework of constitutionally interpreting the norms of current 
legislation in order to consolidate its stand in a given case. For instance, 
such an approach helps to more clearly understand the normative content of 
this or that institution of law, its main (universal) parameters,27 the juridical 
26 Available from: url: http://pravo.ru/story/view/112919/ Viewed 25 May 2017.
27 The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dated 14.07.2005, 
No. 9-P, concerning constitutionality of article 113 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation in 
37Constitutional Justice of Russia within the judicial landscape of contemporary Europe
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 40, enero-junio de 2018, pp. 21-44
nature of certain constitutional rights, the limits of permissible restrictions 
of constitutional rights and so on. 
In this manner, the Constitutional Court of Russia is integrating with 
eChr decisions and its interpretation of the constitutionality of disputed legal 
judgments and the legal stand of the eChr. It is apparent that all this has a 
noticeable impact on the practice of constitutional justice, and at the same 
time, precisely because of this, the decisions and judgments of Russia’s 
Constitutional Court acquire intra-State formal juridical significance. 
At the same time, we must not forget that eChr’s decisions are of a complex 
juridical nature. It is necessary to differentiate the juridical consequences of 
eChr decisions as acts of exercising rights and juridical consequences as acts 
of interpreting the European Convention for the Protection of Human Tights 
that contains a normative element. As acts of exercising rights, i.e., juridical 
facts resulting in consequences for the disputing parties, eChr decisions are 
to be implemented according to Article 46 of the Convention. As acts of 
interpretation, it is generally acknowledged that the eChr”s establishment of 
one or several violations, the Convention obligates that State to put an end to 
such violations and to rectify the consequences, and as far as it is possible, 
to restore the situation that existed prior to the violation. 
The main problem that the Constitutional Court of Russia has encountered 
in its work is the following: simultaneously, it must resolve two not-so-easily 
compatible tasks, namely, to harmonize Russia’s legal system (system of 
law) with Europe’s general legal landscape, on the one hand, and to uphold 
its own Constitutional identity, on the other hand.
The aspects of this problem concern both its content and procedure since 
Russia ranks first among the Member-States of the Council of Europe in 
terms of the absolute number of complaints filed in the eChr. 
The given problem became aggravated in 2009-2010 upon taking up the 
case of “Konstantin Markin versus Russia” that precipitated the issue of 
specifying the role of the Constitutional Court within the mechanism of im-
plementing Conventions. The essence of “the “Markin Case” can be described 
as follows: are there or are there not signs of discrimination in a situation 
when a male serviceman is denied a three-year maternity leave to take care 
of a newborn child as female servicewomen are entitled to?
In this matter, there is an obvious under-estimation of Russia’s socio-cultural 
specifics, and when the eChr demanded that it (Russia) had to overcome 
what the eChr called “gender-biased traditions that had become a widespread 
opinion among the inhabitants of a given country.” And indeed, one must 
admit that such gender prejudices have, by far, not been overcome in Russia. 
And, indeed, herein lays the rub! Such prejudices are to be found nOt in the 
connection with the complaint of citizen G. A. Polyakova and request of the Federal Arbitration 
Court of the Moscow district. Legislation of the RF. 2005. No. 30 (part 2). Art. 3200.
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legal system of the country, but rather in the reality of family relationships 
that are still based, to a considerable degree, on patriarchal traditions of 
distributing roles among men and women. It is precisely because of this that 
Russian legislators endeavor, where it is possible, to grant women legislative 
preferences which, by their legal essence, are not privileges, but rather lawful 
compensation for those additional efforts in bringing up children that fall on 
the shoulders of woman in Russian families. 
Such legislative preferences for women can, in no way, be viewed as 
measures of discrimination against males, but rather should be regarded as 
a way of overcoming discrimination against women that still can be found 
in our society. 
Here, I feel there is a need to underscore the following: in principle, Russia’s 
stand on this issue is not, in any way, at variance with general European values 
concerning gender equality (including in the matter of distributing respon-
sibilities among men and women in bringing up children). Different views 
on this issue arise only when it comes to choosing the means ensuring such 
equality while taking into consideration the specific historical peculiarities 
of the timeframe and locality where the given value is being implemented.
While examining the Constitutional Court’s attitude to eChr Decisions, 
and fulfillment of its own Decisions, here, it is necessary to point out that the 
Constitutional Court steadfastly upholds the principle of obligatory imple-
mentation of eChr Decisions in the territory of Russia. This point has been 
emphasized time and again, in particular, in Act 21-Pas of July 14, 2015, and 
in Act 12-P as of April 19, 2016. When examining its cases, the Constitutio-
nal Court analyzes the practical work of the eChr on corresponding cases, 
and when necessary, it may introduce legal principles and clauses of the eCr 
directly into the text of its own Decisions.
And indeed, one must admit that Russian law has acquired European 
features to a considerable degree. Today, we cannot “close our eyes” to or 
“side-step” such “collisions” between Russia’s Constitutional system and 
decisions handed down by European supra-national structures: this is because 
it has become so deeply involved in the European legal landscape.
It should be noted that out of 168 decisions adopted by Russia’s Cons-
titutional Court, as of May 1, 2010, refer directly to judicial principles of 
the eChr, or refer to its decisions; 160 decisions were adopted under direct 
norm control procedures; four more decisions were passed under abstract and 
another four by “joint norm control” procedures. A number of the Constitu-
tional Court’s decisions refer to conventional norms in the interpretation of 
the eChr and were used not only for founding the legal basis of the Court’s 
stand on the given case, but were also included in the resolution part of its 
decision. Russia’s Constitutional Court is more and more often referring to 
the eChr’s practice within the framework of constitutionally interpreting the 
norms of current legislation in order to consolidate its stand in a given case. 
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For instance, such an approach helps to more clearly understand the norma-
tive content of this or that institution of law, its main (universal) parameters, 
the juridical nature of certain constitutional rights, the limits of permissible 
restrictions of constitutional rights and so on. 
In this manner, the Constitutional Court of Russia is integrating with 
eChr decisions and its interpretation of the constitutionality of disputed legal 
judgments and the legal stand of the eChr. It is apparent that all this has a 
noticeable impact on the practice of constitutional justice, and at the same 
time, precisely because of this, the decisions and judgments of Russia’s 
Constitutional Court acquire intra-State formal juridical significance. 
At the same time, we must not forget that eChr’s decisions are of a complex 
juridical nature. It is necessary to differentiate the juridical consequences of 
eChr decisions as acts of exercising rights and juridical consequences as acts 
of interpreting the European Convention for the Protection of Human Tights 
that contains a normative element. As acts of exercising rights, i.e., juridical 
facts resulting in consequences for the disputing parties, eChr decisions are 
to be implemented according to Article 46 of the Convention. As acts of 
interpretation, it is generally acknowledged that the eChr”s establishment of 
one or several violations, the Convention obligates that State to put an end to 
such violations and to rectify the consequences, and as far as it is possible, 
to restore the situation that existed prior to the violation. 
On June 11, 2015, a group of 93 State Duma members 28 file a query in the 
RF Constitutional Court concerning “contradictions” between national and 
supranational statutes concerning law and order. Certain mass media outlets 
lost no time in linking the query of State Duma members to the Constitutional 
Court with the eChr’s decision in the “yukOs Oil Company versus Russia” 
Case,29 ruling that Russia had to pay out two billion Euros as compensation.30
However, in their query, the State Duma Deputies focused their main 
attention on another eChr decision concerning the complaint of “Anchugov 
and Gladkov v. Russia”31 wherein the eChr upheld the Statute of the Russian 
Constitution which annuls the right to vote for convicts who have violated 
the European Convention on protecting human rights and fundamental free-
doms. The given case concerning the right to vote for convicts was put forth 
28 State Duma is the second chamber of the Federal Assembly (Russian Parliament).
29 oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia. Application N 14902/04, Judgment of 
24 June 2014. Viewed 24 May 2017. Available from: http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/
doc/70059678/
30 kaliniChenkO, P. A. On the question of collision between eChr Acts and Russian 
Constitutional Acts from the point of view of principles of the RF Constitutional Court. Timely 
Problems of Russian Law, 2016, 2, 42-48.
31 Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia. Applications N 11157/04 and 15162/05, of 4 July 
2013. Viewed 22 May 2017. Available from: http://base.garant.ru/70639826/
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by two Russian citizens, each of whom were serving prison sentences for 
murder and several other crimes. 
In its time, Russia’s Constitutional Court rejected such a complaint on 
the grounds that the process of checking whether certain principles of Rus-
sian Constitution correspond with other principles of Russia’s Fundamental 
Law is not within the competence of the Constitutional Court. However, the 
European Court to which the convicts referred their complaint found, that in 
the given case, there had indeed been a violation of the right to participate 
in an election that is guaranteed by Article 3 in Protocol 1 to the Convention 
on protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.32 
However, the eChr failed to take into account that the convicts who filed 
their complaint had disputed not simply the norm of the law, but the norm 
of Russia’s Constitution. And what is more, this concerns a norm that can be 
altered or amended Only by adopting a new Constitution. On this account, 
the eChr, in its decision, noted only that the plaintiff-State (Russia) would 
be able to observe the Convention “by somehow changing the form of the 
political process or its interpretation of Russia’s Constitution.” 
In plain English, this meant that Russia should either adopt a new Consti-
tution within a framework corresponding to “a new form of political process,” 
or give a very flexible interpretation of its text. But agreement with stand 
taken by the eChr and granting the convicts the right to vote in elections 
would have been a direct violation of the Russian Constitution principles 
in terms of their highest juridical power, as well as the priority above any 
other acts of law.
In this situation, the Constitutional Court, on July 14, 2015, passed an Act 
that found the disputed legal principles as “not contradicting the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation.” 
 In its Act passed on April 19, 2016, the Court ruled that legal actions 
of an individual nature were not applicable in respect to citizen Anchugov 
(convicted of murder, theft and fraud) and citizen Gladkov (convicted of 
murder, robbery and participation in organized crime), who were sentenced to 
death and subsequently were commuted to 15 years in prison. These two men 
were convicted of committing especially grave crimes, and consequently this 
means that they should have realized beforehand that they were not eligible 
to make use of the active electoral right either according to the Constitution 
of the RF or any international standards. 
In its work, the Constitutional Court proceeds from the fact that Russia’s 
participation in international agreements does, not at all, imply that it gives 
up its national sovereignty. No international treaty, including the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights ad Fundamental Freedoms, 
32 Constitution of the Russian Federation – 1993. Art. 32 part 2, cit.
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and the stand of the eChr based on the aforementioned document, can nullify 
the priority of the Russian Constitution. However, the practical implementa-
tion of the documents and principles mentioned above in the Russian legal 
system is possible only on condition of recognizing the Constitution as having 
the supreme and uppermost juridical power of Russia’s Constitution and the 
European Convention on Protection o of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms are based on one and the same values. Collisions between the two 
are extremely rare. Nonetheless, such cases are possible, and then, Russia 
shall refrain from fulfilling eChr decisions. In fact, such procedure is in 
line with the practice other countries, and should proceed from the idea of 
not allowing self-isolation, mutual respect and promoting dialogues among 
different systems for protecting human rights. 
Here, it is necessary to point out that only the Constitutional Court is 
empowered to hand down a decision rejecting fulfillment of eChr decisions. 
Without such a stipulation, there remains a threat of “washing out” the 
country’s constitutional supervision in the matter of Russian legislation co-
rresponding with the laws of the Council of Europe.33 The need for a rational 
combination of national laws and international conventions was emphasized 
by the Chairman of Israel’s Supreme Court, Miriam Naor, addressing the 
Vi International Forum of Jurists in May of 2016. In particular, the speaker 
declared: “Human Rights Pacts have been adopted not for the purpose of 
helping mankind to commit suicide.”34
CONCLUSIONS
Once again, the Constitutional Court has underscored its recognition of the 
fundamental significance of the European system for protecting the human 
rights of man and citizen, a part of which are eChr decisions, and has also 
expressed its readiness to seek a legitimate compromise for supporting and 
upholding this system. Confirmation of the high degree of such integration 
steps can be seen in the dynamics of making use of eChr decisions in the 
Acts passed by the Russian Constitutional Court over the past several five-
year periods: in the 2000-2004 period – 15.9% of the Constitutional Court’s 
decisions contained references to eChr decisions; in 2005-2009 – such refe-
rences already numbered 39.1%, and in the 2010-2014 period – this number 
stood at 41.2%.35
33 zOrkin, V. D. Problems of implementing Human Rights Convention. Viewed 20 May 
2017. Available from: http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=72 
34 Official Website of Russia’s Constitutional Court. Viewed 24 May 2017. Available 
from: http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=76 
35 bOnDar, S. N. Value-based origins of legal implementation of Convention requirements 
for Russia’s legal system. Journal of Constitutional Justice, 2016, 2 (50), 8.
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At this point, it should be noted that the degree of mutual integration is 
a factor that the Constitutional Court leaves within its own realm to decide 
since the borderlines of a compromise on the given issue are determined 
precisely by Russia’s Constitution. And this factor fits in precisely with the 
already existing practice of mutual interaction between the eChr and a whole 
number of Member-States that have signed the said Convention. 
The European continent today is experiencing a mutual integration pro-
cess involving varying legal norms. And, the main elements or spheres of 
this process are European institutions on international public law, on the 
one hand, and national institutions of constitutional law, on the other hand. 
And here, it is necessary to bear in mind that in the present-day conditions, 
these two elements, or spheres, international public law and constitutional 
law are regulating relations that in many respects quite similar in nature, and 
coincide to a considerable extent to the areas that they cover.36 On this basis, 
it seems there is a possibility to witness the emergence of a qualitatively new 
transnational phenomenon of law that implies the crystallization of European 
constitutionalism. This is a qualitatively new world philosophical-viewpoint 
category that is reflected not so much in the supranational legal universa-
lization, as in the national-constitutional integration of State-legal systems 
of Europe on the basis of reciprocal enrichment, while still preserving the 
juridical sovereignty of the legal systems. Here, we are talking about filtration 
of convention norms in the national systems of law. 
Colombian expert of Constitutional Law P.A. Acosta Alvarado wrote 
about the growing role of judges in the reformulation process of correlation 
between international and national law.37 This seems to bring forth a kind of 
“polypnonia” of present-day European constitutionalism, or, as the eminent 
Bulgarian Constitutionalist, Yevgeniy Tanchev, remarked: it is a manifestation 
of “multilevel constitutionalism” in the European continent.38 And this is 
based on the premise that mutual interaction between European and national 
legal systems is unfeasible in conditions of subordination, and that only a 
dialogue between the corresponding legal systems can guarantee general 
European legal development. 
36 kOnyukhOVa, I. A. Tendencies, problems and prospects of harmonizing Constitutional 
Law and International Public Law in conditions of present-day development. Constitutional Law 
and International Law in contemporary times. Moscow: raP, 2010, 14-40.
37 aCOsta alVaraDO, P. A. Más allá de la utopía: del diálogo interjudicial a la 
constitucionalización del derecho internacional. La red judicial latinoamericana como prueba 
y motor del constitucionalismo multinivel. Tesis de doctorado, Madrid, 2015, 217. Viewed 25 
May 2017. Available from: http://eprints.ucm.es/28119/1/T35645.pdf
38 tanCheV, T. Constitutional pluralism and multilevel governance in the European Union. 
Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law Studies, 2014, 6 (49), 1052-1062.
43Constitutional Justice of Russia within the judicial landscape of contemporary Europe
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 40, enero-junio de 2018, pp. 21-44
REFERENCES
aCOsta alVaraDO, P. A. (2015). El diálogo judicial interamericano, un camino de doble 
vía hacia la protección efectiva. Diálogo entre cortes. luiz arCarO COnCi y luCa 
mezzetti (eds.). Brasilia: Oab.
aCOsta alVaraDO, P. A. (2014). Diálogo judicial y constitucionalismo multinivel. El caso 
de la red judicial latinoamericana. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia.
alekseyeV, S. S. (2017). The State and Law. Moscow: Prospekt.
baglai, M. V. (1989). A Law-governed State: From ideas to practice. Kommunist. 6, 20-29.
bOnDar, S. N. (2016). Value-based origins of legal implementation of Convention require-
ments for Russia’s legal system. Journal of Constitutional Justice. 2 (50), 4-10.
COltOn, T. (2013). Yeltsin. Moscow: Colibry.
fyODOrOV, B. G. (2011). Ten Mad Days with Boris Yeltsin. Moscow: Algorithm. 
kaliniChenkO, P. A. (2016). On the question of collision between eChr Acts and Russian 
Constitutional Acts from the point of view of principles of the RF Constitutional Court. 
Timely Problems of Russian Law. 2, 42-48.
kOnyukhOVa, I. A. (2010). Tendencies, problems and prospects of harmonizing Constitu-
tional Law and International Public Law in conditions of present-day development. 
Constitutional Law and International Law in contemporary times. Moscow: raP.
maliushin, A. A. (2015). Forms of performing law-making function of the constitutional 
legislation and their place in the hierarchy of the sources of the Russian Law. Law 
Problems, 10, 59-64.
marChenkO, M. N. (2016). Juridical nature and character of the of the European Court 
on Human Right’s (eChr) decisions. Moscow State University Vestnik (Law), 2, 3-20. 
nersesyantz, V. S. (1997). The court does not make laws, neither does it govern – It applies 
laws. Judicial practice as a source of law. Moscow. 
OstaPOViCh, I. Y. (2010). Constitutional Court of RF in normative forming process. Russian 
Juridical Journal. 133-138.
sOlOVyOVa, T. A. (2011). Acts issues by Supreme Court of RF, Constitutional Court of RF 
and European Court on Human Rights in the sphere of civil law and the procedure of 
their implementation. O. V. isayenkOVa (ed.). Moscow: Monograph.
strashun, B. A. (2000). Decisions of RF Constitutional Court as a source of law. Mos-
cow: Norma.
tanCheV, T. (2014). Constitutional pluralism and multilevel governance in the European 
Union. Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law Studies. 6 (49), 1052-1062.
Vitruk, N. V. (2001). Constitutional Justice in Russia (1991-2001). Notes on Theory and 
Practice. Moscow: Gorodets-Izdat.
44 Marianna Abramova
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 40, enero-junio de 2018, pp. 21-44
VOlkOVa, N. S. and habrieVa, T. Y. (2005). Legal Principles of Constitutional Court of 
RF and Parliament. Moscow: Norma.
zOrkin, V. D. (2011). Constitutional Development of Russia. Moscow: Norma. 
zOrkin, V. D. (2010). Contemporary World, Law and the Constitution. Moscow: Norma. 
Literature from Web Site
aCOsta alVaraDO, P. A. (2015). Más allá de la utopía: del diálogo interjudicial a la 
constitucionalización del derecho internacional. La red judicial latinoamericana 
como prueba y motor del constitucionalismo multinivel. Tesis de doctorado. Madrid. 
Available from: http://eprints.ucm.es/28119/1/T35645.pdf
Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia. (2013). Applications n. 11157/04 and 15162/05, of 4 July. 
Available from: http://base.garant.ru/70639826/
Chairman of Russia’s Constitutional Court Valeriy Zorkin denounces Yeltsin’s crimes. 
Available from: http://www.prezidentpress.ru/news/zakon/1622-glava-ks-rf-valeriy-
zorkin-protiv-prestupleniy-elcina.html 
Constitution of the Russian Federation – 1993. Available from: http://base.garant.
ru/10103000/7/#block_7000
Federal Constitutional Law as of July 21, 1994, No. 1-fCl “On Constitutional Court of 
Russian Federation”. Available from: http.//base.garant.ru/10101207/
Informative and Analytical Report on fulfillment of Russia’s Constitutional Court decisions 
adopted during implementation of Constitutional Jurisprudence in 2015. Available from: 
http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/Info/Maintenance/Informationks/Pages/ReportKS201.aspxм
OaO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukosv. russia. Application N 14902/04, Judgment of 24 June 
2014. Available from: http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70059678/
Official Website of Russia’s Constitutional Court. Available from: http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/info
zOrkin, V.D. Constitutional Justice in transitional stage of historical development of Russia. 
Available from: http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=75
zOrkin, V. D. Problems of implementing Human Rights Convention. Available from: http://
www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=72 
zOrkin, V. D. The dialogue of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the 
European Court on Human Rights in the context of constitutional order. Available 
from: ksrf.ru›News/Speech/Pages/ViewItem.aspx
